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THE INSCRUTABLE EVIL DEFENSE AGAINST
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL
James F. Sennett

In this paper I offer a defense against the inductive argument from evil as
developed by William Rowe. I argue that a key assumption in Rowe's argument-that the goods we know of offer us good inductive grounds to make
certain inferences about the goods there are-is not justified. Particularly, I
argue that inscrutable evil-evil such that any good it might serve is not open
to human scrutiny-is not, in and of itself, good reason to believe that there
is any unjustified evil. I then develop the defense by introducing the notion
of a relevant inductive sample and arguing that there is good reason to assume
that the goods we know of are not a relevant inductive sample of the goods
there are-a fact that compromises any strength Rowe's argument might seem
to have.
It is the purpose of this paper to present a defense against the inductive
argument from evil-the argument that the presence of evil in the world
inductively supports or makes likely the claim that an omnicompetent God
does not exist. l I will concentrate on the argument offered by William Rowe,
though I believe that my defense can be revised so as to meet the objections
of any other plausible inductive argument. 2 I focus on Rowe because he is
undoubtedly the dean of contemporary analytic philosophers working in this
field, and because I see his argument to be the clearest, most easily understood, and most intuitively appealing of those available.
In calling my position a "defense," I take advantage of the very useful
distinction between defense and theodicy, made famous by Alvin Plantinga. 3
A theodicy purports to offer reasons for God's allowance of evil, while a
defense has a much more modest task. It seeks simply "to establish that a
given formulation of the problem of evil fails to show theism to be inconsistent or improbable."4 A defense against the deductive argument from evil,
such as the free will defense, only needs to describe possible states of affairs
that entail that God coexists with evil. These states do not need to be actual
(indeed, they do not even need to be probable), nor do they need to describe
what the justification for evil in those states might be. A defense against the
inductive argument from evil would likewise describe a state of affairs entailing that God and evil coexist. However, such a defense must be more than
simply possible. It must be likely or probable enough to outweigh the likeliFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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hood involved in the argument. s Still, a defense need not offer an explanation
for evil. It need only provide a scenario under which God's allowing evil is
plausible, whatever his justification might be.

I
In its most recent form, Rowe's inductive argument from evil considers specific cases of natural evil (a fawn dying a slow, agonizing death in a naturally
caused forest fire) and moral evil (the brutal rape and fatal beating of an
innocent five-year-old girl).6 Calling the first "El" and the second "E2,"
Rowe argues that
P:

No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being's obtaining it would morally justify that being's permitting
El or E2

is true and constitutes good reason for inferring
Q:

No good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being's
obtaining it would morally justify that being in permitting EI or E2.7

Q, together with the assumption that an omnicompetent God would allow
only morally justified evil (an assumption I will grant in this paper),8 entails
that such a God does not exist.
Notice that the only real difference between P and Q is that the words "we
know of' appear in the former and not in the latter. Inherent in the inference
from P to Q is the assumption that what we know about good and evil is good
reason to draw certain conclusions about the nature of all good and evil,
including that about which we have no knowledge. Rowe presents a perfectly
natural justification for this assumption:
[W]e are justified in making this inference in the same way we are justified
in making the many inferences we constantly make from the known to the
unknown. All of us are constantly inferring from the A's we know of to the
A's we don't know of. If we observe many A's and all of them are B's we are
justified in believing that the A's we haven't observed are also B's.9

According to Rowe, the inference from P to Q is as natural, permissible, and
rational as many others made on a daily basis-for example, the conclusion
that all pit bulls are vicious, given that many have been found to be vicious. lO
Rowe admits that this inference is susceptible to defeating information, but
so are all such inferences. This fact alone certainly does not block the rationality of other inductive generalizations. Hence, in the absence of defeating
information, P renders Q more likely, more rationally acceptable, than its
negation. Since Q entails the denial of God's existence, P apparently makes
the denial of God's existence more rational than its acceptance.
Consider the notion of inscrutable evil: evil such that human beings are
unable to discern any divine justification for it-that is, any reason an om-
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nicompetent God might have for allowing it. 11 The genius of Rowe's argument
can be represented as the charge that
P*: There is inscrutable evil
inductively supports
Q*: There is unjustified evil.

For sake of simplicity and clarity, I will work with this formulation of the
argument throughout this paper.12

II
Stephen Wykstra points out that Rowe's argument works only if he is justified
in believing that, were God to exist, the phenomena of inscrutable evil would
appear to us differently from the way they in fact do.13 But, Wykstra argues,
there is no justification for such a claim. Wykstra speaks of goods that are
"beyond our ken"-that is, goods that we cannot recognize or understand as
goods. Since God can recognize and understand such goods, Wykstra maintains that, if theism is true, then it is likely that the goods served by many
instances of suffering will be just such goods-those beyond our ken. Thus,
we should expect that many of the instances of suffering we see will not
appear to us to be justified. Therefore, Rowe's assumption that the existence
of God would make it likely that many evils would appear to us differently
than they do (i.e., many evils that do not now appear to us as justified either
would not occur or would appear to us as justified) is unfounded.
In response, Rowe finds fault with Wykstra's move from "[God] can grasp
goods beyond our ken," to "It is likely that the goods in relation to which
[God] permits many sufferings are beyond our ken." Rowe asserts that this
move makes sense only if "the goods in question have not occurred, or. .. remain quite unknown to us [once they have occurred]." But, Rowe asserts,
there is little in the assumption of theism that warrants either of these claims.
The mere assumption that [God] exists gives us no reason whatever to suppose either that the greater goods in virtue of which he permits most sufferings are goods that come into existence far in the future of the sufferings we
are now aware of or that, once they do obtain, we continue to be ignorant of
them and their relation to the sufferings.14
That is, Rowe charges that Wykstra's defense requires that he have reasons
for
(1)

All inscrutable evil serves goods that are beyond our ken,

and there is no such reason, even given the existence of God. But Rowe is
mistaken in thinking that Wykstra must have reasons for (1) in order to make
a case against the inference of Q* from P*. All that is required is that (1) be
no less likely than not-that is, that there is not reason sufficient to justify
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denial of it. Since the existence of God entails that there is no unjustified
evil, the existence of God plus the existence of inscrutable evil entails (1).
That is, if God does exist, any inscrutable evil must be due to the fact that
the goods that justify such evil are goods that we cannot discern as goods.
There is no reason to assume that such a scenario is either impossible or a
priori improbable. Therefore, at worst the existence of God simpliciter offers
no reason to assume (1) to be more or less likely to be true. Hence, evidence
that God does not exist must consist not only of the presence of inscrutable
evil, but also of reason to assume that (1) is less likely than not. As long as
(1) is considered no more likely to be false than true, one does not have a
case for the denial of theism.
This line of thought is what I call "The Inscrutable Evil Defense." The key
premise of my argument is
(2) If God exists and is omnicompetent, then it is at least no less likely than
not that all inscrutable evils serve goods beyond our ken.
(2) is the claim just argued for-that theism is at worst neutral with regards
to (1). But more can be said on behalf of (2). Specifically, given that there
is no reason to think that all evil will serve discernible goods, there is no
reason to deny, and perhaps some reason to assert, that the line of demarcation
between inscrutable evils and other evils just is the line of demarcation
between evils serving goods beyond our ken and those serving goods we can
discern. That is, the reason why these evils are inscrutable is precisely that
they are the ones serving indiscernible goods. There is no prima facie reason
to reject this assumption in favor of an atheistic deduction. At the very least,
such an assumption is no less likely than not. This alone entails (2).
Now, (2) maintains that God's existence renders (1) at least no less likely
than not, given God's existence. If it is simply no less likely than not, or only
more likely to an inductively insignificant degree, then the existence of God
and (1) together do not inductively support -,P*. On the other hand, if it
renders (1) more likely than not to an inductively significant degree, then the
existence of God and (1) together inductively support P*. Hence, (2) entails
(3) Either the existence of an omnicompetent God and (1) together inductively support P*. or they do not inductively support its denial.
(3) entails that p* must be accompanied by some reason to assume that (1)
is less likely than not in order to make a case against theism. Absent such
reason, p* alone cannot make a case against theism. So, it follows from (3)
that
(4) p* alone does not make the existence of God less likely than not.
Now, Q* entails that God does not exist. Therefore, p* would make Q* more
likely than not only if p* would make it more likely than not that God does
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not exist. ls But we see by (4) that p* does no such thing. Therefore, we can
conclude
(5) Inscrutable evil is not good evidence for unjustified evil (Le., P* does
not inductively support Q*).

Without the assumption that (1) is less likely than not, Rowe's argument does
not go through.

III
In this section I will explore the exact nature of the defect in Rowe's reasoning from p* to Q*, which is exploited by the Inscrutable Evil Defense.
Concerning the analogous inference of All pit bulls are vicious from the
evidence I have encountered a fair number of pit bulls and they were all
vicious (alluded to in section I above), Rowe points out that the evidence
justifying the inference could be defeated by discovering that "all the pit bulls
I've encountered have been trained for fighting ... [and] there are many pit
bulls that are not so trained."16 The defeat Rowe alludes to is evidence that
the sample of pit bulls to which he has been exposed is not a relevant sample
for the inductive inference he makes. Prior to acquaintance with such evidence, Rowe is prima facie justified in believing that his sample is relevant
for the inference. But if he encounters the evidence, he loses his justification.
So, in the absence of defeating evidence, Rowe has no reason to believe
(6) The pit bulls I have encountered do not constitute a relevant inductive
sample for the inference in question.

This lack of reason for (6) (among other things) gives him prima facie justification for making the inference.
Likewise, Rowe is prima facie justified in making the inference from p*
to Q*, in part, because he has no reason to believe
(7) The goods we know of do not constitute a relevant inductive sample of

the goods there are,

which is the analogue to (6) for this inference. The truth of (7) would defeat
the support of Q* by P*. That is, the conjunction of p* and (7) would not
inductively support Q*. SO, if one is justified in believing (7), then one is not
justified in inferring Q* from P*.
I will now present three arguments that, coupled with the assumption that
an omnicompetent God exists, each constitute good reason for believing (7).
As such, these arguments constitute, separately and conjointly, evidence sufficient to defeat the inference from p* to Q* for anyone properly appreciative
of them.
First, the existence of an omnicompetent God entails that there is at least
one super-human intelligence and moral sensitivity in the universe. There-

THE INSCRUTABLE EVIL DEFENSE

225

fore, there is some being capable of grasping concepts, ideas, or situations
infinitely above what we are able to grasp. Yet one assuming that (7) is false
assumes that human moral sensitivities are capable of grasping enough truth
from the goods they can discern to make very large generalizations about all
the goods there are. Such an attitude displays a human chauvinism that is
certainly out of place in a world of super-human moral sensitivities. Given
omnicompetence, there is reason to believe that (7) is true and to reject the
inference from p* to Q* as unjustified.
Second, ludaeo-Christian tradition teaches that humanity is "fallen," and
that among the consequences of this fallenness is a perverted moral outlookone that often mistakes good for evil and evil for good-and one that cannot
begin to fathom the purposes of God. From such a viewpoint, belief of (7) is
virtually mandatory. Far from being part of a relevant inductive sample, many
of the "goods" we know of may not even be goods at all. Our moral sensitivities are not only too limited to justify denial of (7), as in the first argument
above. They are also "out of tune," and at times deliver unreliable pronouncements. Hence, at least one representative theistic tradition offers good evidence to believe (7).
One important objection to this argument must be addressed before I go
on. Rowe argues that no expansion of theism (such as the ludaeo-Christian
tradition) is any more likely than basic theism (i.e., the belief that an omnicompetent God exists), given the existence of inscrutable evil. l7 Since any
expanded theism entails basic theism, the former will be at least as improbable as the latter, given the existence of inscrutable evil. l8 However, Rowe
also discusses a response to this claim from Robert Adams, who argues that
one must simply make a judgment between two hypotheses: (i) that basic
theism is significantly less probable gi yen inscrutable evil than it is prior to
such consideration; and (ii) that a given expanded theism is not significantly
less probable than basic theism. Rowe assumes that the first hypothesis is
true, and therefore concludes that the second, even if true, does not help the
theist's case. But, Adams points out, it is not clear that this is the only, or
even the most rational, course to take. If instead we first assume that (ii) is
true, then if the expanded theism under consideration succeeds in explaining
the presence of inscrutable evil, there is little reason to believe that (i) is true,
or to be worried about it if it is.
Rowe responds that one pursuing Adams' strategy must
argue that E [the evidence of inscrutable evil] does not significantly discon-

firm RST [Restricted Standard Theism-i.e., basic theism] by showing that
there are not implausible hypotheses that, when added to RST, produce a
result that both accounts for E and is not significantly less probable than is
RST itself. To pursue this ... way would be to endeavor to give some not
implausible suggestions concerning [God's] reasons for permitting E.
Whether the theist can succeed in this task remains to be seen. l9
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But again Rowe has described the task before the theist too strongly. The
theist need not provide an expanded theism that gives "suggestions concerning [God's] reasons for permitting E." All she needs to do is provide "not
implausible" suggestions concerning the relationship between God and the
world that make it likely that there would be inscrutable evil-regardless of
the actual purposes God has in permitting it. (Rowe seems to have conflated
the distinct tasks of theodicy and defense, identified in the introduction to
this paper.) The version of expanded theism I have employed here-basic
theism plus the doctrine of the fall-offers a "not implausible" reason to
assume that there would be inscrutable evil, and therefore accomplishes the
task at hand. 20
But perhaps the best argument for (7) is one from analogy. The goods my
ten-year-old daughter knows of are in no way a relevant inductive sample of
the goods I know of. This fact causes conflict and consternation between us
at times, and may even drive her to the conclusion that some of my decisions
and actions, which bring what she discerns as evil into her life, cannot possibly serve any good purpose-a conviction as inescapable to her mind as is
Q* to Rowe's mind. This fact is due to my daughter's developmental status,
which prevents her from perceiving or conceiving the evidence that would
defeat the support her observations give to her conclusion that I am causing
her evil for no good purpose.
Certainly there is at least as much difference between human moral posture
and that of an omnicompetent God as there is between those of my daughter
and me. Hence, the evidence of disparity between my daughter's moral perspective and mine is good evidence for a similar disparity between mine and
God's. Since such a disparity defeats the assumption that the goods she knows
of are a relevant inductive sample of the goods I know of, it also defeats the
assumption that the goods I know of are a relevant inductive sample of the
goods God knows of (i.e., of the goods there are). That is, it is good evidence
for (7). But, of course, if (7) is true, then the argument from p* to Q* is no
stronger than the argument about pit bulls, given the defeating evidence (that
is, not strong at all). The sample is not sufficient to support the induction. 21

IV
I have not argued that no one can justifiably infer Q* from P*. However, my
argument does have the consequence that anyone justified in making the
inference is in such a situation purely because of an unappealing sort of
epistemic ignorance. The defeaters I have introduced are not so obscure or
esoteric as to be available only to the scholar or the deep thinker. In fact,
they are quite obvious and natural within the theistic tradition. A minor
excursion into possible rebuttals that the theistic community could offer to
Rowe's argument would reveal these and similar retorts. In fact, I maintain
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that such defeaters are so readily available that most people who would feel
tempted to make the inference from p* to Q* could uncover them with only
a minimum of effort. If this is so, such people may be guilty of epistemic
neglect in not making the minimal effort to uncover them, and therefore
unjustified in making the inference anyway. After all, the issue at stake
here-the existence of God-is important enough to call forth at least a
minimum of inquiry from one who would dare to make an inference to a
conclusion on the matter.
So a trilemma faces the one who would ground her atheism in the inference
from p* to Q*. Either she has reason to believe (7) or she does not. If she
does, then she is not justified in making the inference. If she does not, then
there are two possibilities. At best she lacks such reason due to ignorance,
and therefore is not in the most desirable epistemic situation. She is justified
in making the inference from p* to Q* only by default, and not because of
any competence in reasoning. At worst she lacks reason for (7) because of
epistemic negligence in failing to uncover the relevant defeaters. In this case
she is unjustified in her failure to believe (7) and unjustified in inferring Q*
from P*. Either way, the power of Rowe's inductive argument for undergirding atheism has been severely compromised. 22

Palm Beach Atlantic College
NOTES
1. The term "omnicompetence" names that property borne by an object just in case it
is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect.
2. A powerful, though extremely technical, argument is offered by Paul Draper in "Pain
and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists," Nous 23 (1989), pp. 331-50. I am
confident that my defense can be translated into the probability calculus and shown to be
an effective defense against Draper. This is a project I hope to undertake some timethough I know it will be, as they say, no mean task.
3. The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 192. Plantinga attributes
this distinction to Henry Schuurman.
4. Michael Peterson, et aI., Reason and Religious Belief' An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 100.
5. Robert Adams makes this point nicely in "Plantinga on the Problem of Evil," in James
Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, eds., Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: D. Reidell, 1985),
pp.242f.
6. Rowe's argument was originally presented in Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1978), pp. 86-92. This argument was later developed and
expanded in "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 335-41. Rowe responded to some important criticisms and
presented a new formulation of the argument in "The Empirical Argument from Evil," in
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Robert Audi and William Wainwright, eds., Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral
Commitment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 227-47. His latest formulation at the time of this writing is in "Evil and Theodicy," Philosophical Topics 16.2
(1988), pp. 119-32. While these latter two formulations differ in emphasis, the argument
remains pretty much the same as it was in "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of
Atheism." Rowe has responded to more criticisms and clarified some relevant issues in
"Ruminations About Evil," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 69-88.
7. "Evil and Theodicy," pp. 120ff. In "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of
Atheism," Rowe offers the following argument:
(i) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(ii) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any

intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
Therefore
(iii) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

This argument is deductive. The induction lies in the defense of the first premise. The
argument from P to Q in the text is an argument for this premise.
8. For an important attack on this assumption, see William Hasker, "The Necessity of
Gratuitous Evil," Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992): 23-44. Rowe has responded to Hasker
in section III of "Ruminations on Evil."
9. "Evil and Theodicy," pp. 123f.
10. Ibid., p. 124.

11. Throughout this paper I will speak of '1ustified" and "unjustified" evil with this
sense in mind.
12. This revision actually strengthens Rowe's case. In the original argument, lack of
known justification for a given evil is taken as evidence that that evil is unjustified. In my
reformulation, the fact of inscrutable evil in general is taken as evidence that at least some
of it is unjustified. My revision allows, as Rowe's original formulation does not, that some
of the inscrutable evil considered is in fact justified. It only suggests that it is more
reasonable to assume that some inscrutable evil is unjustified than to assume that all of it
is justified.
13. "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the
Evils of 'Appearance,'" International Journalfor Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), pp.
73-93.
14. "The Empirical Argument from Evil," p. 238.
15. It is a theorem of the probability calculus that, if P(AlB)=n and A entails C, then
n. Therefore, since Q* entails God does not exist (-,G), P(Q*/P*) > 112 only if
P(-,G/P*) > 112. The latter is false, and so, therefore, is the former.

P(CIB)~

16. "Evil and Theodicy," p. 124.
17. "The Empirical Argument from Evil," pp. 239f.
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18. It is a theorem of the probability calculus that, if A entails B, then P(A/C) ~ PCB/C).
19. "The Empirical Argument from Evil," p. 240, n. 16.
20. It is arguable, I suppose, that this version of expanded theism is in fact significantly
less probable than basic theism. I believe that there are good reasons for denying this
claim, though I will not broach them here. Suffice it to say that, even if this version of
expanded theism is significantly less probable than basic theism, the first and third
arguments I give for (7) are grounded only in basic theism-deriving only from logical
consequences of omniscience and moral perfection-and therefore do not rely on any such
expansion.
21. Rowe has responded in conversation that my daughter may well understand that I
am unable to bring about the good I seek without allowing the evil in question. But
omnicompetence precludes us believing this of God, at least in many cases. The point
here, however, is that the great disparity in the moral perspectives my daughter and I
possess precludes her from understanding that there is any good being served at all by
the evil. A fortiori, such a lack of perspective will also preclude her understanding how
that good could be served without the evil. So also with our moral perspective vis a vis
God's. If we can discern no good at all that would be served by inscrutable evil, why is
it surprising that we cannot perceive a good for which such evil is a necessary condition?
If the gap in moral perspective allows that inscrutable evil may indeed serve some
indiscernible good, why should it not also allow that it is a necessary condition for this
good, and hence justified by it?
22. I thank Robert Audi, AI Casullo, Phil Hugly, Al Plantinga, and William Rowe for
helpful conversations on these issues and comments on previous drafts of this paper. I
also thank Rowe for pre-publication access to "Ruminations on Evil." Finally, I thank
Philip Quinn and two anonymous referees for Faith and Philosophy for great help in
bringing the manuscript to publishable form.

